### WideLeak: How Over-the-Top Platforms Fail in Android

Gwendal Patat, Mohamed Sabt, Pierre-Alain Fouque University of Rennes, CNRS, IRISA

June 30th, 2022









## Over-the-Top Platforms



























































#### Attacker Model

### Capabilities

- Legitimate User Access
- Full Device Control

#### Goal

Redistribution of media



#### Some DRM Solutions







Figure: Example of DRM Systems



## Generic DRM Usage




Figure: OTTs and DRMs.



#### Modern DRM






Figure: Decryption Module and decoder are outside of the application.



#### Modern DRM











#### Widevine

#### General

- Closed-source.
- Owned by Google since 2011.
- One of the most deployed DRM (Android TV, Smartphone, Browser, ...).

\_evels

- L1: Media decryption and playback in
- L3: Media decryption and playback



#### Widevine

#### General

- Closed-source.
- Owned by Google since 2011.
- One of the most deployed DRM (Android TV, Smartphone, Browser, ...).

#### Levels

- L1: Media decryption and playback in secure environment (e,g,. TEE).
- L3: Media decryption and playback software-only solution.



#### Widevine

#### General

- Closed-source.
- Owned by Google since 2011.
- One of the most deployed DRM (Android TV, Smartphone, Browser, ...).

#### Levels

- L1: Media decryption and playback in secure environment (e,g,. TEE).
- L3: Media decryption and playback software-only solution.



- Inspect the Widevine ecosystem in Android.
- Monitoring and reverse engineering of Widevine cryptographic operations
- Empirical study on OTTs usage of Widevine regarding DRM guidelines
- Unfixable Proof-of-Concept for Media recovery in legacy devices



<sup>1</sup>https://github.com/Avalonswanderer/widevinel3\_Android\_Po

- Inspect the Widevine ecosystem in Android.
- Monitoring and reverse engineering of Widevine cryptographic operations.
- Empirical study on OTTs usage of Widevine regarding DRM guidelines
- Unfixable Proof-of-Concept for Media recovery in legacy devices



https://github.com/Avalonswanderer/widevinel3\_Android\_PoC

- Inspect the Widevine ecosystem in Android.
- Monitoring and reverse engineering of Widevine cryptographic operations.
- Empirical study on OTTs usage of Widevine regarding DRM guidelines.



- Inspect the Widevine ecosystem in Android.
- Monitoring and reverse engineering of Widevine cryptographic operations.
- Empirical study on OTTs usage of Widevine regarding DRM guidelines.
- Unfixable Proof-of-Concept for Media recovery in legacy devices.<sup>1</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://github.com/Avalonswanderer/widevinel3 Android PoC

## Widevine and Android



#### DRM in Android







Figure: DRM Framework before Android 11 (src: source.android.com)

## Widevine Monitoring

- Python tool based on Frida<sup>2</sup>.
- Attached to the Media DRM Server for L1 and L3 compatibility.
- Avoid Apps anti-debug techniques.

- Monitor the control flow of Widevine execution.
- Log parameters and return values
- Dump buffers linked to provisioning for analysis.





## Widevine Monitoring

- Python tool based on Frida<sup>2</sup>.
- Attached to the **Media DRM Server** for L1 and L3 compatibility.
- Avoid Apps anti-debug techniques.

- Monitor the control flow of Widevine execution.
- Log parameters and return values.
- Dump buffers linked to provisioning for analysis.












Figure: Widevine under Android



Provision Server



License Server









Figure: Widevine under Android



Provision Server



License Server





Provision Server







Figure: Widevine Root-of-Trust: Keybox









Provision Server



License Server






Figure: Widevine Provision Key






Figure: Widevine Content Key(s)



- Recommended: Audio and video encrypted with different Content Keys
- Minimum: only the video is protected or same Content key as for the audio
- Do not support devices no longer receiving security updates



- Recommended: Audio and video encrypted with different Content Keys.
- Minimum: only the video is protected or same Content key as for the audio
- Do not support devices no longer receiving security updates



- Recommended: Audio and video encrypted with different Content Keys.
- *Minimum*: only the video is protected or same Content key as for the audio.
- Do not support devices no longer receiving security updates



- Recommended: Audio and video encrypted with different Content Keys.
- *Minimum*: only the video is protected or same Content key as for the audio.
- Do not support devices no longer receiving security updates.



Is Widevine used at all by OTTs?



## Do OTT apps use Widevine?

# 10 premium OTT apps based on Google Play Store popularity and regional bank account restrictions.

- Netflix (1,000M+)
- Disney+ (100M+)
- Amazon Prime Video (100M+)
- Hulu (50M+)
- HBO Max (10M+)

- Starz (10M+)
- myCANAL (10M+)
- Showtime (5M+)
- OCS (1M+)
- Salto (1M+)



## Do OTT apps use Widevine?

# 10 premium OTT apps based on Google Play Store popularity and regional bank account restrictions.


- Netflix (1,000M+)
- Disney+ (100M+)
- Amazon Prime Video (100M+)
- Hulu (50M+)
- HBO Max (10M+)

- Starz (10M+)
- myCANAL (10M+)
- Showtime (5M+)
- OCS (1M+)
- Salto (1M+)



## What about assets protection?






Recommended Minimum

- 100% of OTTs protected their video assets.
- 30% of OTTs send their audio files in clear.
- Only one OTT uses different content keys for audio/video.






Recommended Minimum

- 100% of OTTs protected their video assets.
- 30% of OTTs send their audio files in clear.
- Only one OTT uses different content keys for audio/video.






Recommended Minimum

- 100% of OTTs protected their video assets.
- 30% of OTTs send their audio files in clear.
- Only one OTT uses different content keys for audio/video.






Recommended Minimum

- 100% of OTTs protected their video assets.
- 30% of OTTs send their audio files in clear.
- Only one OTT uses different content keys for audio/video.

## Are discontinued phones still supported?



## L3 Legacy Phone Support




■L3 Legacy Support ■ No Playback ■ Custom L3

 Most OTTs chose to ignore revocation recommendations of Widevine and to send media to L3 devices.




## **Android L3 RoT Recovery**
















Reversing the obfuscation can easily be avoided thanks to an insecure memory deallocation in munmap calls.



Reversing the obfuscation can easily be avoided thanks to an insecure memory deallocation in munmap calls.



## Widevine KeyBox: RoT structure

Field	Description	Size (bits)		
Device ID	Internal Device ID	256		
Device Key	128-bit RoT AES key	128		
Provisioning Token	Used by provision requests	576		
Magic Number	'kbox' (0x6b626f78)	32		
CRC32	CRC32 validating the keybox integrity	32		
Total		1024		

Table: Widevine Keybox



## Widevine KeyBox: RoT structure

Field	Description	Size (bits)		
Device ID	Internal Device ID	256		
Device Key	128-bit RoT AES key	128		
Provisioning Token	Used by provision requests	576		
Magic Number	'kbox' (0x6b626f78)	32		
CRC32	CRC32 validating the keybox integrity	32		
Total		1024		

Table: Widevine Keybox



## Widevine KeyBox: RoT structure

Field	Description	Size (bits)		
Device ID	Internal Device ID	256		
Device Key	128-bit RoT AES key	128		
Provisioning Token	Used by provision requests	576		
Magic Number	'kbox' (0x6b626f78)	32		
CRC32	CRC32 validating the keybox integrity	32		
Total		1024		

Table: Widevine Keybox



## Our Keybox

00000000 00000010																		
00000020																		
00000030	00	00	00	02	00	00	11	5d	22	13	9f	e5	9a	2d	с4	a4	000 • 00 • ]	"•xxx-xx
00000040	c5	f9	10	e3	58	4f	76	b8	53	4d	9b	f4	2e	bd	a4	25	××°×X0v×	SM××.××%
00000050	3с	04	84	ea	99	f8	cd	37	8d	b7	df	17	20	9d	9a	23	<*xxxxx7	xxx° xx#
00000060	ef	6b	74	54	ea	89	99	9a	98	1f	2e	55	c1	60	ac	98	×ktT××××	×°.Ux`xx
00000070	50	03	9a	5f	fd	2c	7a	2d	6b	62	6f	78	5e	9e	9b	f2	P*x_x,z-	kbox^xxx




## Key Ladder Mimicking

## Can it be fix?



### Can it be fix?

## Just kidding, it cannot.



#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices

- Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.
- The obtaseated software only selfente earlies a
  - with no fix possible for discontinued phones
- CVE 2021 0630
  - CVE-2021-0639.
  - Android Security Bulletin August 2021.\*



#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices.

- Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.
- The obfuscated software-only scheme can be broken trivially due to simple mistakes
  - with no fix possible for discontinued phones.
- CVF\_2021\_0639 <sup>3</sup>
  - Android Convity Pulls
  - Android Security Bulletin August 2021.





#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices.

#### Widevine DRM:

Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.







#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices.

- Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.
- The obfuscated software-only scheme can be broken trivially due to simple mistakes.
  - with no fix possible for discontinued phone:
- Disclosure to Google in June 2021 and discussion with multiple OTTs.
  - CVE-2021-0639.
  - Android Security Bulletin August 2021.



 $<sup>^3 \</sup>mathtt{https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-0639}$ 

#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices.

- Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.
- The obfuscated software-only scheme can be broken trivially due to simple mistakes.
  - with no fix possible for discontinued phones.
- Disclosure to Google in June 2021 and discussion with multiple OTTs
  - CVE-2021-0639.
  - Android Security Bulletin August 2021.



<sup>3</sup>https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-0639

#### **OTT Apps and Widevine:**

- OTT apps do not fully protect their assets regarding Widevine guidelines.
- Large support of outdated devices.

- Reverse engineering of the Widevine cryptographic key ladder.
- The obfuscated software-only scheme can be broken trivially due to simple mistakes.
  - with no fix possible for discontinued phones.
- Disclosure to Google in June 2021 and discussion with multiple OTTs.
  - CVF-2021-0639 <sup>3</sup>
  - Android Security Bulletin August 2021.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2021-08-01#widevine Patat et al. (University of Rennes, CNRS, IRISA)



<sup>3</sup>https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-0639



Paper Preprint<sup>5</sup>

# Thanks for your attention

@ gwendal.patat@irisa.fr



Avalonswanderer



<sup>8</sup> https://people.irisa.fr/Gwendal.Patat/assets/publications/wideleak.pdf